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ABSTRACT 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine how firms deal with a situation of 
true uncertainty about their potential markets and technologies. Specifically, we ask 
how firms can create products when the corresponding market does not exist. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on a longitudinal study of a 
high-tech firm, combined with analysis of existing theory in Product Design and 
Entrepreneurship. 
Findings – Markets and products are usually a defining choice made early on by firms 
in their strategic process. Such a choice guides their development by providing a ‘stable 
concept’ to which decisions can be related to. When markets do not exist yet, however, 
this approach is not effective: Early choice of products and markets limits firms’ 
flexibility by constraining their ability and willingness to adapt, while fundamental new 
technical and market information is likely to emerge during the project that will prove 
the initial assumptions wrong. 
We show an alternative approach where products and markets actually result from a 
generic process of products and markets exploration driven by the firm. We suggest 
that this approach forms a robust design in that it allows the firm to deal with the 
uncertainty by simultaneously developing its products and exploring markets, while 
preserving the flexibility to adapt to the changing environment. 
Practical implications – The practical implication of this paper is to suggest an 
alternative approach to deliberate planning in high-tech ventures. With this approach, 
rather than markets and products, strategy defines a market and technology exploration 
process. 
Originality/value – The paper is original in three ways: 1) It links the product design 
and market exploration processes in high-tech firm development; 2) It is based on an 
in-depth longitudinal study; and 3) It results from an academic-practitioner 
collaborative work. 
Keywords New Product Development, uncertainty, high-technology venture 
Paper type Research paper 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine how firms deal with a situation of true, 
“Knightian” (Knight, 1921) uncertainty that characterizes emerging or 
disruptive environments. Using an in-depth case study approach, we seek to 
understand how the firm evolves from an initial situation of uncertainty about 
its potential markets and products to a situation where an opportunity has been 
defined and the corresponding products are created.  
The choice of products and markets are both essential components of a firm’s 
strategy (Grant, 1995). It is thought that these provide stability that will guide 
the firm’s development, and possibly define its identity. The early and 
appropriate definition of these strategic components, even before the firm’s 
creation, is assumed to be an important success factor, as exemplified by the 
institutional importance given to business planning (Honig, 2004). 
Underpinning this assumption is the predominant use of causal rationality in 
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management. Causal rationality assumes pre-determined and well-structured 
ends, and formulates the decision problem as one of discovering the best 
possible means to achieve those ends. Causal reasoning proceeds inward by 
breaking given goals into sub-goals and sub-sub-goals to specific individual 
tasks (Sarasvathy and Kotha, 2004). Causal rationality, with its emphasis on 
maximizing expected return or minimizing expected costs and avoiding 
surprises through accurate prediction and comprehensive competitive analysis, 
has long served as the normative foundation for both research and pedagogy in 
business management. It implies the definition of a clear goal, and works with a 
logic of optimization; i.e., given a particular goal, what is the optimal way (in 
terms of resources) to reach it. 
High-tech firms, however, seek opportunities in disruptive contexts where 
neither their products nor the corresponding market generally exist at the time 
of the disruption. In this context, goals cannot be defined easily, markets cannot 
guide product development, and causal rationality does not work anymore. How 
can firms create products when the corresponding market does not exist? 
We organize the paper as follows. We first highlight and discuss the core 
concepts of entrepreneurship and product design relevant to our issue. 
Following this discussion, we describe our methodology and then report on our 
findings. We then discuss those findings and draw their managerial implications 
for high-tech venture management. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
To characterize the disruptive contexts in which high-tech firms operate, Knight 
(1921) distinguished between risk and uncertainty using the concepts of 
probability. Risk consists of a future with a known distribution, or a distribution 
that can be estimated by studying events over time. For instance, in the case of a 
box with six red balls and six blue ones the probability of a particular color 
being drawn (an event) is perfectly known. On the contrary, “Knightian” 
uncertainty consists of a future whose distribution is not only unknown, but 
objectively unknowable. The key difference between Knightian uncertainty and 
risk is that Knightian uncertainty involves dealing with a future that has no 
discernible distribution whatsoever, not even in theory. In this case, therefore, 
neither the calculus of a priori probability nor techniques of statistical 
estimation can work (Sarasvathy and Kotha, 2004), because the involved 
objects do not exist yet. To reuse the box example, we do not know whether 
there is a box, how many balls there are, and the concepts of box and balls 
might even not be defined. For instance, key elements of the Internet were 
invented in the late sixties, and commercial application only became significant 
in the early nineties (Slater, 2002). Such applications were totally unanticipated 
by the original inventors of the technology: they designed the Internet for 
military use, ie to provide a secure communication network in case of nuclear 
war; it is now used for rather different applications such as book buying, 
television watching, music distribution and game playing. 
While firms in established industries (e.g. banks, insurance companies) face 
risk, those in emerging industries face Knightian uncertainty. They trade in a 
context where prediction is impossible (Knight, 1921), goals are not 
predetermined (March, 1982), and the environment does not independently 
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select the outcomes (Weick, 1979). Early choice of products and markets, in 
such a context, limits firms’ flexibility by constraining their ability and 
willingness to adapt (Bhide, 1994; Fredrickson and Acquinto, 1989); as a result, 
firms are particularly sensitive to disruptions and turbulence and every 
discontinuity generates an erratic trajectory. 
Sarasvathy (2001) studied how entrepreneurs deal with a situation of Knightian 
uncertainty. She showed that they inverted the principles of causal reasoning 
and that the inversions together constituted a comprehensive new logic that she 
calls “Effectuation”. Effectuation is a sequence of non-predictive strategies in 
dynamic problem solving that is primarily means-driven, where goals emerge as 
a consequence of stakeholder commitments rather than vice versa. An 
alternative to causal (predictive) rationality, effectuation suggests that 
“Knightian” actors succeed by taking a progressive approach to the definition of 
their products and markets (Wiltbank, Dew, Read and Sarasvathy, 2006). What 
matters, therefore, is not which products and markets they choose ex-ante, but 
how, in the absence of current markets for future products, such products get 
created by the firm (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) and how this process 
allows the firm to resolve the Knightian uncertainty. 
Traditional models for product development projects have emerged from 
observations in relatively mature, industrial environments, such as the 
automobile industry (e.g. Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Their focus is on 
developing a structured process with clearly defined and sequential phases for 
the development project through which the future product is defined, transferred 
to manufacturing, and rolled out to the market (Iansiti, 1995). Those models 
imply a clear separation between concept development, specification definition, 
and implementation. Underlying them is the assumption that products are 
developed in order to serve markets that already exist and have been selected by 
the firm. As such they adopt a causal logic and tend to pose the problems in 
terms of optimization. They work well in environments in which technology, 
product features and competitive requirements are predictable, and no new 
information is expected that would significantly change the specifications. 
In Knightian uncertainty, however, markets do not exist yet, and fundamental 
new technical and market information is likely to emerge during the project. 
Uncertainty is such that even the product concept itself can be modified, or even 
changed completely. For instance, RealNetworks, the current leader in media 
streaming technology over the Internet, started out as a project to create a TV 
channel (Sarasvathy and Kotha, 2004). In this context, the success factor shifts 
from the capability for optimized project execution to the capability to react to 
new information during the course of the project by changing the product 
specifications (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Iansiti, 1995), possibly to a large 
extent. To model the exploratory nature of the design process in such 
environments, and the blurring of the distinction between the specification and 
implementation phases, Hatchuel and Weil (2002) introduced the Concept-
Knowledge (CK) design theory. CK is based on the articulation of knowledge 
with the exploration of new products concepts. A unit of knowledge is a 
proposition with a logical status (true or false). For instance, in designing a car 
with a platform strategy, a unit might be “The car must use Platform X”. A 
concept is a notion or proposition without a logical status. It is an innovative 
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proposition used as a basis for initiating a design project. A “flying boat”, for 
instance, is neither true, nor false, nor uncertain. The design process starts when 
unknowns are created by proposing a new concept (going from Knowledge ‘K’ 
to Concept ‘C’). This initial concept is then expanded using properties that have 
a logical status in K. Concepts are expanded through design spaces, which need 
existing knowledge, and also generate discoveries and investigation processes 
that in turn expand the initial concept (Hatchuel, 2006). The design process 
stops when this dual expansion of concepts and knowledge leads to a concept 
that can be proved either true or false with the resulting knowledge (flying boat 
has become a “hydropter”). CK theory is directly applicable in design situations 
where the work is not based on detailed specifications or a well-identified 
definition of the object to be designed. It helps the researcher describe the 
design work not as a deterministic process of optimization, but as a creative 
exploration, thus meeting one of the design requirements in Knightian 
uncertainty (Hatchuel and Weil, 2002). 
With these core concepts as a starting point, we report empirical findings that 
suggest how a firm may overcome Knightian uncertainty. Taken together, the 
findings show that WSoft1 succeeded in resolving Knightian uncertainty by 
defining its stable concept as a generic process of products and markets 
exploration.  
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Approach 
The paper is based on a longitudinal case study of WSoft, a small European firm 
developing mobile phone software. We seek to explain how the firm was able to 
resolve the Knightian uncertainty about its products and markets. Case study 
research, whether using single or multiple cases, has not only been used 
effectively for descriptive and exploratory purposes, but also for explanatory 
purposes including frame-breaking causal inferences about complex and 
important phenomena (Sarasvathy and Kotha, 2004). As opposed to statistical 
generalization, case study research allows analytical generalizations (Yin, 
2003).  
This study contributes to the integration of concepts and theories by using the 
extended case method, which aims to integrate and synthesize existing bodies of 
work. In contrast to the Grounded Theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), 
the primary focus of the extended case study is not to build new theory. Rather, 
its method is to integrate and extend existing theories through an iterative 
process of traveling back and forth between the data, pertinent literature and 
emerging theory (Danneels, 2002). Specifically, we seek to integrate the 
entrepreneurial theory of opportunity and the product development theory in the 
context of emerging markets. 
As with any idiographic research, we recognize that the entrepreneurial 
processes that WSoft employed can be unique and that such processes may be 
difficult to identify and measure. In such cases, it is the generative mechanisms 
or underlying processes that are generalizable and not the unique phenomena 
described (Tsoukas, 1989). The challenge here, therefore, is in identifying these 
                                                     
1 Name disguised 
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processes, and the drivers of such processes, in the creation and early market 
development of WSoft.  
Choice of firm 
We chose this firm as a case study because, as a player in the market for mobile 
phone software, it exemplifies the phenomenon of interest. The mobile phone 
industry is characterized by rapid and unpredictable evolution: pioneers have 
exited the market (e.g. Alcatel, Siemens, Philips), merged (e.g. Ericsson), or are 
currently in difficulties (e.g. Motorola). Asian competitors, once poised to 
overtake them, have had various degrees of success: while Korea’s Samsung 
has become the second largest manufacturer worldwide in just a few years, 
Taiwan’s BenQ’s attempt has failed and the company has since exited the 
market. The industry is also characterized by high profile industry-wide product 
failures, such as the WAP mobile Internet in 2001, and unexpected successes 
such as text messaging. Repeated disruptions threaten to undermine the position 
of actors who cannot react fast enough. For instance, Nokia’s leading position 
was compromised when the company failed to anticipate the sudden popularity 
of clam-shell phones or of the camera feature in 2003. While the origin of the 
mobile phone industry can be traced back to the 1970s, it is still undergoing 
significant disruptions, and as such is typical of a situation of Knightian 
uncertainty. It is in this context that WSoft attempts to develop its products and 
markets, and establish itself as leader. While this leadership position is not yet 
reached, and may not be reached, the firm has successfully dealt with a situation 
of Knightian uncertainty: it is growing profitably and is recognized as a key 
player, having won designs with important clients in its field.  
Data collection 
Data was collected through a two-year full-time presence in the company. Our 
primary source of data was the cofounder and CEO of the firm, who is part of 
the research team as a reflective practitioner (Schön, 1983) and a co-author of 
this article. Other sources of data were: 1) interviews with other founders of the 
firm; 2) accounts of actions provided by the firm in the form of press releases; 
3) analysis of internal reports as well as emails exchanged during the studied 
period; and 4) analysts’ reports (both on firm and industry) whenever available. 
To gather industry related background information, we relied on multiple 
sources such as news.com and telecoms.com, online industry trade magazines, 
as well as electronic databases of press articles such as Factiva. 
As typical in inductive research (Eisenhardt, 1989), the data collected from 
these multiple sources served as the basis for our own detailed case study on the 
mobile software industry and WSoft’s role in it. To establish the validity of the 
reconstruction process, we compared our case history with studies in close 
fields of the software industry, such as Sarasvathy and Kotha’s (2004) study of 
RealNetworks, Cusumano and Yoffie’s (1998) study of Netscape, as well as 
Battelle’s (2005) study of Google. We used the case histories (our own and 
others) to identify the product and market related actions taken by the firm, and 
to create tables to organize this data chronologically. 
These different sources enabled us to examine the data from multiple vantage 
points (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and triangulate facts and inferences. For 
example, press releases provide detailed information on entrepreneurial actions, 
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often including top managers’ vision of the market and expected consequences 
of these actions. However, analysis of press releases was limited: they tend to 
emphasize the positive aspects of the various actions (Rindova and Kotha, 
2001), and it was not possible to supplement the analysis with media reports 
examining the same actions owing to the limited visibility of the firm at that 
time.  
Analysis 
Our unit of analysis consisted of the decision-events that occurred in the 
creation of the firm pertaining to technology, products and markets choices. We 
performed a process trace of the decision-events as they occurred, using the 
event listing method prescribed by Miles and Huberman (1994). We began by 
listing the decision-events in their chronological order and then examining the 
relations between product-related, technology-related and market-related 
decision-events.  
We then performed a trace of the domain-knowledge explored by the firm as 
such decision-events occurred. Such tracing allowed us to examine the role of 
learning in the development of the firm in relation to these decision-events.  
As typical in qualitative research, the validity of our insights was checked with 
senior executives of the firm as well as with other academic members of the 
research team. 
RESULTS 
Products and markets do not define the stable concept 
Most companies start with an initial target market or product, and WSoft is no 
exception. Starting in 1998, WSoft’s initial business idea was to provide IT 
services in the field of Web sites development. One year later, trying to get into 
the product business, the firm initiated a project called SH aimed at creating an 
inter-personal communication platform over the Internet. The firm tried, but 
failed, to raise money for SH, and the project was discontinued. In early 2000, 
the firm got a contract to develop mobile phones services (using the WAP 
standard) for a large mobile operator, entering the mobile market for the first 
time. Based on this experience, and switching back to the product business, it 
developed a WAP simulator that was sold, with moderate success, to a few 
wireless operators. In 2002, this simulator was extended and transformed into a 
browser, and ported to personal digital assistants (PDA). The idea was to use it 
to develop mobile access to corporate information systems. WSoft would work 
with IT services providers who would sell the product to their corporate clients. 
However, the market didn’t take off in large part due to the lack of maturity of 
mobile communication at that time, and the firm exited the market. The browser 
was then adapted to fit onto a mobile phone, to target mobile phone 
manufacturers. Despite a certain interest, the product was sold only to a few 
clients. In 2003, however, upon a client’s suggestion, it was further transformed 
into a user interface engine. Introduced in 2004, the new product has since been 
successful, and the firm is now growing profitably.  
During the period, the firm’s products and markets changed radically several 
times, yet the firm remained the same in the sense that its key constituents 
didn’t change. Its business model, defined as the development and licensing of 
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software, didn’t change. Its management and shareholding didn’t change. Its 
employee turnover was nil, and the firm didn’t experience any traumatic change 
or crisis. Neither markets nor products, therefore, can adequately define the 
“stable concept” of the firm, which must therefore be defined differently. 
The evolution of products and markets was not random 
Was there, indeed, a stable concept besides the structure itself? The firm’s 
trajectory might have been purely chaotic, with markets and products being 
randomly tested out. Upon close examination, however, the changes in markets 
and products clearly did not appear as random; the evolution of the firm 
followed an iterative, path-dependent process contingent upon (1) relationships 
forged by the firm, (2) the firm’s product development thrust, and (3) its 
environment. For instance, the WAP contract was obtained for reasons falling 
into these categories. Firstly, the management happened to know the client’s 
project manager. Secondly, the firm could claim it did know the technology, 
which it had learned with the SH project which played the role of 
complementary asset (Tripsas, 1997) (i.e. an asset whose development had not 
been considered a priority but whose importance suddenly rose upon a change 
in the firm’s context) and such competences were scarce at the time, and larger, 
established service providers were too slow to react. Thirdly, the client was in a 
hurry. The importance of the firm’s product development thrust is exemplified 
by how the market for the user interface engine came about. The firm had been 
trying to sell its mobile phone browser with limited success for some time when 
a client suggested that the technology could be adapted to create a user interface 
(UI) engine. User interface had become a major headache for manufacturers as 
phones were becoming more and more sophisticated, and such engine could 
well provide a solution to this growing issue. Within six months, WSoft was 
able to transform the browser to that effect and begin addressing this 
opportunity with the resulting new product.  
More generally, our analysis of the firm’s chronology of decision-events shows 
that each product/service and market iteration was possible because it was in 
some way connected to the existing trajectory, thus allowing a trajectory of 
cumulative learning. 
A simplified, high-level version of the chronology of action-events is shown in 
Figure 1. The firm started out as a provider of development services. It first 
focused on Web applications, then moved into the related field of mobile Web 
applications. It then used its newly acquired knowledge to create a mobile Web 
browser using the Java technology. This product was adapted for several 
platforms ending on a mobile phone. Another iteration transformed it into a UI 
engine, and a final iteration consisted into rewriting it from the Java 
programming language into C. 
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Figure 1. Chronology of Decision-events 
The fact that (1) neither products nor markets can adequately define the ‘stable 
concept’ of the firm; and (2) the evolution of the firm’s products and markets 
was not random, but driven by an iterative path-dependent learning process, this 
suggests that the firm defined its stable concept as a generic process of product 
and market exploration. This begs the following question to be asked: how does 
product design theory relate to this proposition? 
Market exploration and product development based on lineage management 
Complex software such as that for mobile phones takes months, sometimes 
years to develop. How was the firm able to drive this development while not 
knowing in advance which markets it would target? We observed that the last 
product the firm developed from scratch was the WAP simulator introduced in 
2000, seven years ago. All of the firm’s subsequent products derived from it, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Succession of products 
While today’s user interface engine for mobile phones (Product KR) and the 
initial simulator (WPW) have nothing in common, we created a CK (Hatchuel 
and Weil, 2002) reconstitution of the design history which shows that the 
evolution followed an iterative, path-dependent process, from one product 
concept to another, always with a strong common technological base between 
the two. An extract of this reconstitution, describing the transition from WPM to 
KR (step 3 to 4), is shown in Figure 3. 
  9   
 
Figure 3. Reconstitution of Product Design history, from product concept WPM to 
product concept KR 
As Figure 3 shows, there is a constant exchange from C to K and K to C back 
and forth. Different types of knowledge are used (return from experience, 
market related and technical/design expertise) to every single logical component 
of the initial product, thus allowing a continuous progress from one product 
concept to another. We start from the concept: “A UI engine for mobile phones” 
(other approaches are possible to address the UI need), try a solution along one 
branch, backtrack, explore another branch, etc. until we have completely 
defined what “A UI engine for mobile phones” means in terms of knowledge: a 
functional layer using parameters and developed in the C language. In between, 
a series of intermediary products have been tried out, including the product 
WPM. KR, the end-product, is the result of this exploration. 
This sequence of products constitutes a lineage (Hatchuel and Weil, 1999), i.e. 
an evolving asset that provides both continuity and variation to the design 
process. Lineage management helped the firm drive the exploration in 
technology and customer needs on one side, and organize value-creating reuse 
of acquired knowledge on the other side. The trajectory of domain-knowledge 
explored by the firm, from its inception to the existing product-market, is 
depicted in Figure 4. Four main domains are distinguished: platform (for which 
WSoft creates products), customer, Field (the actual business problem solved by 
WSoft’s product or service), and Technology (that needs to be mastered to 
address the business problem). Mapping the evolution of products with these 
domains shows the continuity of the process and the gradual stabilization of the 
domains, which stop changing. The first to be set is the platform, which is 
defined when WSoft focuses on embedded systems. Then comes the type of 
customer (mobile phones manufacturers), then the field (User Interface) and 
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finally the technology, when the product is rewritten from the Java to the C 
language. 
 
Figure 4. Domain-knowledge explored by the firm 
When an opportunity was identified, instead of creating a product from scratch, 
which would have taken too long and de facto exclude the firm from this 
opportunity, the current product went through another iteration, leveraging 
hitherto accumulated knowledge. The technological solution embodied the 
learning and allowed the business concept to function. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to understand how high-tech firms deal with a 
situation of true, Knightian uncertainty about their potential products and 
markets. We studied a wireless software firm that was successful in its attempt. 
The study highlighted three factors that we believe contributed to this success. 
Firstly, the firm did not define its stable concept in terms of products and 
markets. Secondly, this did not mean that the evolution of products and markets 
was random, but rather path-dependent based on cumulative learning, the result 
of an organized exploration. Thirdly, the exploration of markets and the 
products development were based on lineage management, reflecting the 
strategic importance of product design in the firm’s strategy. 
Lineage-based strategy for startup development 
Product innovation has long been shown to drive learning about customers and 
technologies (Maidique and Zirger, 1985). Underpinning the firm’s concept is a 
product design strategy relying on a generic technical solution evolving as a 
lineage that provides both continuity and variation to the design process. The 
continuity reflects the cumulative learning of previous iterations, while the 
variation allows local explorations. It was not, however, just a case of 
technology-push development process as is so common in technology ventures. 
The CK reconstitution of design and market trajectory shows a simultaneous 
process of products and markets design, in effect a combination of both 
technology push and market pull (Berthon, Hulbert and Pitt, 1999). The design 
process allowed the creation of products that supported market exploration, but 
market exploration fed the design process in return, until both converged to an 
  11   
opportunity. This ability to adapt to the evolution of the target market differs 
from similar concepts such as mass customization, a concept introduced by 
Davis (1987). Mass customization is an effort to resolve the paradox of 
combining the ability to adapt a product to each customer while maintaining 
economies of scale. Mass customization differs at least in two ways with lineage 
management. Firstly, mass customization is effective in a clearly defined market 
where the customization accounts for minor differences among customers 
within an existing segment, such differences being predictable. Put another way, 
the variation occurs within a finite space defined by a small number of 
parameters, and all possible variations are perfectly known in advance. 
Secondly, mass customization is static: instances of the product are customized, 
but the product itself doesn’t change: this is a condition to reap economies of 
scale. Lineage, on the contrary, involves profound changes in the product itself 
to allow addressing new and possibly unexpected market needs. Lineage 
management also differs from the platform approach. Gawer and Cusumano 
(2001) define a platform as “an evolving system made of independent pieces 
that can each be innovated upon” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2001). By organizing 
the ex-ante sharing of given architecture and/or common elements of product or 
process, the platform embodies the firm’s existing knowledge; what is expected 
from a derivative project is not new knowledge, but economies of scope. A 
platform is static by definition: while its constituting elements might evolve. 
The platform approach is therefore not a strategy for exploration learning, but 
an efficient one for exploitation learning. 
By defining the space of concepts within which the market exploration can take 
place, the iterative, cumulative, and path-dependent lineage-based product 
design process actually limits the opportunities that the firm can pursue: what 
can be achieved in terms of new product from an existing technology base with 
one iteration is necessary limited. While this might seem to be an 
inconvenience, Moore (1999) showed the benefit of focus in uncertain 
environments. It limits unnecessary variation and avoids a random walk of 
products and markets. It supports the effectual approach of development by 
providing a product basis upon which the firm can base its ‘next’ effectual 
iteration. 
Robust design through second order competencies 
As noted by Teece, Pisano et al. (1997), deciding, under significant uncertainty 
about the future states of the world, which paths to commit to and when to 
change paths is the central strategic problem confronting the firm. While 
technological and customer competences can be thought of as first-order 
competences, the ability to identify, evaluate, and incorporate new technological 
and/or customer competences into the firm (i.e. a competence at explorative 
learning and design by exploring and designing new markets or new technology 
can be thought of as a second order competence (Collis, 1994)). Second order 
competences enable a company to renew itself through building new first-order 
competences related to technologies and markets (Danneels, 2002). They 
provide flexibility and allow cumulative learning. The definition of the stable 
business concept in terms of second order competences allows to 
simultaneously explore markets to create value with the generic technical 
solution, and learn from the exploration in terms of markets and products. It 
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forms the basis of a “robust design” (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001) of the firm, 
defined as the ability to simultaneously make advances while preserving the 
flexibility to respond to new situations. 
Surviving Knightian uncertainty 
This ‘robust’ approach allows the firm to solve the problem of Knightian 
uncertainty because it combines exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). 
The general model of strategy process is that of an initial period of exploration, 
often before the firm’s creation, which ends up when an opportunity is 
identified, after which the firm turns to exploitation based on previously 
capitalized knowledge on products and markets. Firms such as Netscape 
(Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998) or Google (Battelle, 2005) are typical of such 
approach. In our case, however, explorative learning is not limited to the initial 
phase, but constant in the development of the firm. This learning process is 
structured in terms of reuse and leveraging of existing knowledge and 
competencies into revenue generating products on the one hand, and prudential 
exploration of new markets opportunities and technology development on the 
other. Knightian contexts are characterized by complete uncertainty about 
products and markets. In those contexts, the role of exploration is crucial. 
Developing customer and technology competences, and then exploiting them, is 
not enough. Envisioned markets might not come about. New products might 
fail. New opportunities might emerge unexpectedly that could alter the product-
market pair of the firm. Exploration results in greater ability to adapt to changes, 
and thus supports future viability (Danneels, 2002). While exploitation provides 
vital short-term resources, exploration enhances the adaptation of the 
organization to a changing environment because it increases the variance of 
organizational activities (McGrath, 2001). This suggests that the firm should 
maintain equilibrium in terms of exploration and exploitation, despite likely 
institutional pressures from shareholders that call for a switch to exploitation. 
More generally, the study suggests that Knightian uncertainty is resolved by the 
definition of the stable business concept of the firm in terms of product and 
market exploration. The concept allows an iterative process of technology push 
and market pull, driven by a deliberate strategy of learning. 
Managerial implications 
The practical implication of this paper is to suggest that high-technology firm 
management might go beyond two traditional oppositions. Firstly, between 
deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), and secondly, 
between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). A deliberate strategy of 
learning and lineage management is combined with an emergent strategy of 
market development: markets cannot be anticipated, but they can be created by 
actively driving a learning and technology development strategy. The 
articulation between the deliberate and emergent paths is provided by the 
product design strategy based on lineages. Exploration does not stop at an early 
stage but is pursued and combined with the exploitation of current products and 
markets. Rather than markets and products, the overall firm’s strategy consists 
in defining a market and technology exploration process to resolve Knightian 
uncertainty. 
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CONCLUSION 
Firms in disruptive environment have to deal with a situation of true uncertainty 
about their potential markets and technologies. We asked how firms can create 
products when the corresponding market does not exist. 
This case study suggests that instead of defining the firm in terms of markets or 
products, a definition as a generic process of learning and organizational 
development constitutes a robust approach that allows the firm to resolve the 
uncertainty by simultaneously developing its products and exploring markets, 
while preserving the flexibility to respond to new situations. 
 
This paper results from a research initiated two years ago on the development 
mode of high-tech startups. Insight on the relation between the design process 
and the market exploration has already been gained. While our findings are 
largely consistent with the recent literature on Product Development and 
Entrepreneurship, they must be confronted to a larger sample of firms in order 
to mitigate the issue of contingency. The idea of a second order stable concept 
was not deliberately defined by WSoft but rather emerged empirically from an 
initial lack of market and technology success. We think entrepreneurial firms 
would benefit from having a normative framework from the outset to increase 
their effectual performance. Future research will aim at creating such 
framework.  
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